APM v2.10.0

Linux static binaries compiled 2026-10-08. Copy, chmod +x, run. Zero dependencies.

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Upgrading an existing install? — Since v2.8 a worker with no user line in a root-owned path refuses to start instead of silently running as root, and the CLI needs root or membership of group apm. Run sudo apm healconf after installing: it checks your config and every include, explains each setting this version reads differently, and fixes it with a backup beside the file (--check only reports; --yes applies every safe fix). apm upgrade runs the check for you.
Windows Defender false positive — Microsoft Defender may flag APM binaries as Wacatac.B!ml. This is a known false positive: its ML heuristic misfires on statically compiled Go binaries and UPX-compressed executables. It has been reported to Microsoft for review. All other major antivirus engines report these files as clean — see the VirusTotal links below for full scan results.
Linux
x86_64 / amd64
apm-v2.10.0-x64 standard 9.0 MB
SHA-256: e6e9c596072f50ed360a3172b470b065e2fc7121f55f2446c09f6053b97e3ef9 VirusTotal (pending)
apm-v2.10.0-x64-upx UPX 2.8 MB
SHA-256: 24c4e5ace32d648aa442acb6e17d6b43728c99a78173c6b13a5c958176d92ba6 VirusTotal (pending)
Linux
ARM64 / aarch64
apm-v2.10.0-arm64 standard 8.3 MB
SHA-256: da8205d5ce6d48e2d330bc3b32748db6815f182ccf02aa1b379dd1e339c605a6 VirusTotal (pending)
apm-v2.10.0-arm64-upx UPX 2.4 MB
SHA-256: 2113c509bf80fc02366b8b48e9d1bc71c5f77c00e36c0468f4cab8d70d9e8fe0 VirusTotal (pending)
Linux
ARMv7 / armhf
apm-v2.10.0-armhf standard 8.6 MB
SHA-256: 4d194075712d04fb62e65ae4309b0c4cca862834bc7220a6cd8217c28094012c VirusTotal (pending)
apm-v2.10.0-armhf-upx UPX 2.4 MB
SHA-256: 29a28a88344c5c63944e06d7a59348e3c92191b20f1a5b419cb15e199f80d51d VirusTotal (pending)
This release is signed. metadata.json (the SHA-256 of every file above), install.sh and each connector carry an ed25519 signature beside them as <file>.sig. The public key is compiled into every APM binary since v2.10: apm upgrade refuses anything that does not verify, and apm verify <file> <file>.sig checks a download by hand. Key fingerprint (SHA-256 of the public key): f6af819d1b56bcc075a009f5051bb3a4bcf5d0cd962b513d763898a8ca09527f
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAJaQi2HxEjH2ncrimkjGwyyj1XYYwfqTtSPuNT2VIiy8=
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
To check with OpenSSL: openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey apm.pub -rawin -in metadata.json -sigfile <(base64 -d metadata.json.sig)

v2.10.0 — releases are signed

Review batch 3. Every file apm upgrade acts on — the release manifest, the installer, the connectors — now carries an ed25519 signature, and the public key is compiled into the binary: an upgrade refuses anything the maintainer did not sign, a downgrade is refused unless asked for, a specific version can be installed, and the last three releases stay published as rollback targets. apm verify checks a file by hand; the connectors' self-update uses it.

Nothing to configure. The upgrade to 2.10 is the last one that trusts TLS alone; every one after it is verified by the binary you already have.

Details in the timestamped note beside this file.